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OFAbstract
The role of the Spanish scientiﬁc community in the initial assessment of the environmental and socioeconomic damages caused by
the Prestige oil spill is analysed. A discussion of the reasons for the failures in the response of the scientiﬁc community is presented,
highlighting that despite the existence of adequate human capital and infrastructures, failures were related to the weakness of the
structures and organisational capacity of the scientiﬁc institutions and the public administration. Some developments for an
effective response to future catastrophes are proposed: (1) oceanographic and ecological models, including scientiﬁc and local
knowledge; (2) management systems for scientiﬁc information; (3) organisational and incentive systems to allow the creation of
temporary, large and well-organised multidisciplinary teams; (4) protocols for rapid, ‘‘real-time’’, damage assessments; and (5)
participation of different social groups (NGOs, ﬁshers’ organisations, aquaculture industry or volunteer groups) in plans for the
assessment and management of crises.
r 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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EC1. Introduction
The oil tanker Prestige, loaded with a cargo of
77,000mt of heavy bunker oil ran into problems off the
Galician coast (an autonomous region in the NW Spain)
on November 13, 2003. After a 6-day odyssey following
an erratic course, it ﬁnally sank 130 miles west off the
southern coast of Galicia [1,2]. Over the course of these
6 days, about 19,000 of oil were spilled, and in the
following months around 40,000mt of fuel leaked into
the sea with large slicks drifting towards the Galician
coast. The oil spill reached ﬁrst the Atlantic shores of
Galicia and later the Spanish Cantabrian and the
French Atlantic shorelines up to Brittany, and to a
lesser extent, the north coast of Portugal. This oil spill73
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uino@udc.es (R. Muin˜o).may be considered as one of the worst in history, both in
terms of the type and volume of hydrocarbons spilled as
well as the extent of the disaster, affecting the coastline,
subtidal and continental shelf bottoms [3,4].
Moreover, the disaster caused by the Prestige
triggered a social crisis leading to a movement of mass
protest [5,6]. In this sense, the socio-political climate
during the ﬁrst few weeks and months after the
beginning of the oil spill created conditions that were
not at all conducive to scientiﬁc work, and at the same
time they highlighted the limitations imposed by the
organisation of the Spanish and Galician scientiﬁc
community when faced with responding to problems
of this nature.
The ecological impacts of an oil spill (and its socio-
economic consequences) depend upon multiple, difﬁcult
to predict, factors which give rise, in cases such as this,
to opposing initial assessments owing to speculations75
77
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interests that are more or less legitimate (ranging from
standpoints given with caution so as not to cause
unnecessary alarm, to intentionally concealing informa-
tion to protect the interests of a speciﬁc political action
or economic sector). Social concern also tends to
diminish exponentially over time, while obtaining
objective information is only possible in the medium
and long term.
The present paper analyses different topics related to
the role of scientists and the Galician and Spanish
scientiﬁc communities in the initial (mainly in 2002 and
2003) assessment of the environmental and socioeco-
nomic damages caused by the Prestige oil spill and the
recovery of the ecosystems affected. A discussion of the
reasons for the failures in the response of the scientiﬁc
community is presented, with an analysis of two key
aspects: the availability of human capital and infra-
structures, as well as the structures and organisational
ability of the scientiﬁc institutions and the public
administration. Lastly, we will use the experience
acquired in this catastrophe to draw up some proposals
for improvement that might be able to increase the
efﬁciency of future scientiﬁc actions in the event of the
occurrence of natural catastrophes.
We do not intend to judge the management of this
crisis or its socio-political consequences. We must
remember, however, that the scientiﬁc activity was often
the focal point of public debate and political confronta-
tions and that the response of the scientists was
conditioned by this socio-political context. Probably,
this situation created the worst possible scenario to
carry out scientiﬁc work. T
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EC2. Organisational structure of the scientiﬁc community
In order to understand the (or the lack of) scientiﬁc
response, ﬁrst of all we must brieﬂy review the
organisational structure of the scientiﬁc community in
Spain, both in the area of marine sciences (those in
charge of assessing the environmental and ecological
impact, and of carry out bioremediation and ecosystem
restoration actions), as well as in the social sciences
(which focus on the study of the socio-economic impact
and actions to recover the affected human commu-
nities). We will focus our analysis on the marine
sciences, a ﬁeld that presents a wider ranging institu-
tional diversity and played a more important role in the
initial stages of the crisis. The social scientists potentially
related to the response to the Prestige oil spill work
mainly at the universities, and the reﬂections made for
the case of the marine sciences at universities are largely
applicable to them.
Marine scientists who would be potentially involved
in an oil spill in Galicia of this kind generally belong toED
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three types of institutions, although their ﬁelds of
expertise may not pertain to this division. The Auton-
omous Government of Galicia (Xunta de Galicia,
XUGA) has centres and specialists in the marine
environment and ﬁsheries covering coastal or inshore
waters where artisanal ﬁsheries operate [7]. The Spanish
Government through the Ministry of Science and
Technology (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologı´a, MCyT;
replaced after mid-2004 by the Ministry of Education
and Science), has set-up different research centres
specialised in marine sciences, such as the centres
dependent on the Higher Council of Scientiﬁc Research
(Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, CSIC):
the Instituto de Investigacio´ns Marin˜as established in
Vigo (south Galicia) and other centres along the Spanish
Mediterranean coast, and the Instituto Espan˜ol de
Oceanografı´a (IEO) with two coastal centres (in A
Corun˜a, North Galicia and Vigo). The fundamental
task of the IEO is the assessment of ﬁshery resources,
particularly those managed by the Spanish Government
(through the General Secretariat of Maritime Fisheries
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food) that
is in charge of the resources from the ‘‘offshore’’
continental shelf (semi-industrial ﬁsheries, mainly traw-
lers, purse-seiners and longliners) and distant-water
industrial ﬁsheries. In addition, the IEO has research
groups specialised on the marine environment, and
therefore, not focused exclusively on ﬁsheries. The
CSIC, on the other hand, is an institution that conducts
a more academic-oriented type of research, offering
more freedom and diversity in terms of research topics
pursued by their scientists.
The public universities in Galicia (A Corun˜a, Santia-
go de Compostela and Vigo) and in other parts of Spain
boast a number of research groups in the ﬁeld of marine
sciences. In fact Galicia has the largest concentration of
this type of scientists in all of Spain. It could be assumed
that research done in the framework of the Spanish
university is virtually independent of the guidelines of its
managing bodies (at the level of the university or
autonomous government on which it depends economic-
ally and legally, despite the autonomy of the university),
and it generally hinges upon small groups (or individual
researchers) often with little inter-connection. This
university model corresponds, at least in part, to a
model of incentives that has been set-up to promote
scientiﬁc activity, based on individual productivity
(measured mainly by papers published in scientiﬁc
journals of recognised international reputation) which
tends to lead to a quest for highly productive lines of
research that do not require large infrastructures
(fundamental in a great deal of marine research, but in
most of the cases unavailable at Spanish Universities),
with occasional collaborations between individual scien-
tists and/or small groups. This model works reasonably
well in normal situations, as is evidenced by the rise in
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scientiﬁc productivity at the universities in recent years
[8].
To fully understand the university model, we must
consider a second factor related to the measures
implemented by different public administrations (espe-
cially the XUGA, and recently, although to a lesser
extent, the European Union), to create research groups
with a minimum critical mass that will allow for the
optimisation of the resources. The design of these
measures generate hierarchal structures, in which the
scientists come together out of legal needs, creating
dependencies that do not always correspond to scientiﬁc
activity (which for the most part continues to be
conducted on an individual basis or in small groups
with little cooperation and coordination). Moreover,
interdisciplinary activity is not encouraged, rather it is
hindered, owing both to formal difﬁculties as well as to
the lack of consideration given to this type of research.
Furthermore, as was demonstrated by the catastrophe
of the Prestige, the universities are not endowed with
adequate managerial and organisational structures
capable of offering urgent responses to meet the needs
of a multidisciplinary and coordinated scientiﬁc action
in the face of situations of crisis. At the same time, the
mentality and objectives of the university scientists
generally tend to restrict this process, as it is difﬁcult to
establish common objectives acceptable for the research-
ers and mechanisms to coordinate their work. The
public administrations have little or no capacity to
demand that the scientists come up with immediate
responses to situations of crisis and, in the case of the
Prestige oil spill at least, they may show little interest, in
view of the difﬁculties involved in controlling the
information that would be generated. The public
administration, naturally, has an essential instrument
to involve the scientists of interest to them, as they
control the great majority of funds earmarked for the
research and monitoring of the marine environment.
Even so, the organisational structure of the universities
may greatly hinder the organisation of rapid, inter-
disciplinary responses to speciﬁc problems.
Research centres depending on both the XUGA and
the IEO are potentially equipped with the ability to
respond rapidly to critical situations since they can
immediately change the work plans of their scientists
and deﬁne speciﬁc objectives depending on their socio-
economic and political interests (inclusive although they
may contradict scientiﬁc criteria). The case of the CSIC
may be considered as a de facto intermediate situation
between the above cases and that of the universities,
having many different aspects in common with the
latter.
A new situation, still in the early stages, which was
observed in the case of the Prestige, is the appearance of
other organisations more or less independent from the
public administration, which have a certain capacity torespond to these problems or may be able to fund
research and assessment carried out by independent
scientists (either from the private sector or from the
universities and the CSIC) [6]. This is exempliﬁed by the
different NGOs, belonging primarily to the environ-
mentalism, and the ﬁshers’ associations, the great
majority of which have organised into the Commission
of Fishers’ Organizations (Cofradı´as de Pescadores)
affected by the Prestige oil spill, which have carried
out these types of activities.ED
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3. The scientiﬁc response of the Spanish and Galician
Governments
We will not present a detailed analysis here of the
chronology of actions and their characteristics and
objectives, but it is clear that in the early days of the
crisis, there was a high degree of disorganisation and a
lack of response to immediate needs [1,5,9]. Later, both
the autonomous and central governments, through their
research centres (and each one almost always acting in a
totally independent way) started a series of activities
geared towards the impact assessment and the monitor-
ing of the evolution of the oil spill, and to monitor
pollution in order to assure food security as well as to
protect the marine environment in general. During this
second stage, the studies were designed mostly without
consulting the university scientiﬁc community, where a
great deal of the scientiﬁc experience in marine science is
concentrated, and without consulting most of the
groups working within the public administration.
The Galician Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime
Affairs (Consellerı´a de Pesca e Asuntos Marı´timos)
tackled the bulk of the problem right from the
beginning, both in terms of informing the public as well
as assessment and research [1,6]. Its actions appear to
have been totally autonomous and isolated from the rest
of the scientiﬁc community and even today detailed
information about the studies conducted, their objec-
tives and results has been not made public, except for
the part that deals with food safety, which has been
directed at re-opening ﬁshing zones after precautionary
closures [10].
The IEO started in December 2002 a series of studies
focusing on the Galician and Cantabrian continental
shelf ecosystem and its ﬁshery resources [11], making use
of its own infrastructures and human resources. Most of
the results were made public right away and are
consistent with the existing scientiﬁc knowledge on oil
spills. However, the coastal zone was probably the most
affected habitat by the Prestige spill, and the effects on
the shelf were of lower intensity [4,12], which means that
the usefulness of the data provided by the IEO may be
limited for a comprehensive evaluation of damages. In
fact, the IEO has continued and even stepped up its
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routine scientiﬁc actions focused in the assessment of
ﬁshery resources. From the standpoint of optimising the
use of the limited existing resources, the priority given to
increasing studies on the continental shelf is debatable
when the coastal area has suffered graver damage and
studies on the latter have been limited due to restrictions
of human, material and ﬁnancial resources. This high-
lights another limitation of the scientiﬁc organisation,
which does not allow to take advantage of all the
resources of an institution like the IEO, to be able to
respond to a problem that is out of the scope of its work
plan (for legal and administrative reasons, most than for
scientiﬁc motives).
In December 2002, the MCyT, through the CSIC,
began to draw up a medium-term plan of action which
included, oddly, almost exclusively the participation of
scientists from Mediterranean centres. It was not until
the end of the process, probably owing to public and
private criticism, that they started to admit contribu-
tions from other institutions and centres as well as from
universities in Galicia and the rest of the country.
Inexplicably, most of the work devoted to the design of
a plan of action, has not been published. The response
of the CSIC has ﬂuctuated widely over time, with a
deluge of reports and the apparent start of studies a few
months after the disaster (at the height of public demand
for scientiﬁc investigations), which later appear to have
slowed down or even disappeared, at least as far as
public dissemination is concerned (this fact is evident
checking the reports published on their website and the
dates) [13].
The role played by the IEO and the CSIC appears to
reveal an institutional interest in leading the scientiﬁc
response and controlling the resources that might be
mobilised to this end as well as internal struggles within
and between these institutions coveting this role.E 93
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RR4. Scientiﬁc and social response of the universityThe response of the university has been almost absent
at the institutional level (except in the case of some
scarcely effective statements) and it has turned into the
response of individuals or small groups, who have
organised themselves in view of the lack of action and
errors made by the public administration. At the
Galician Universities, there has been a clamour for an
organisation that would allow for the creation, on a
temporary basis, of multidisciplinary groups to handle
the scientiﬁc assessment of the crisis and respond to
social demand. However, the management teams have
been unsuccessful in meeting this demand, owing
possibly to the fact that there is no a previous design
or adequate resources available for this purpose.
Different research groups have conducted studies, most
of them still underway and not yet published, which dealED
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with speciﬁc aspects of the oil spill, but they have been
designed based on the ﬁelds of expertise and interests of
the participating scientists and therefore, it is highly
unlikely that a complete assessment of the problem can
be obtained.
Moreover, public statements made by the university
scientists, both individually and as a group, have
generally been extremely critical of the decisions and
management of the public administration, denouncing
its assessment of the problem, its lack of action or the
incorrect response and the withholding of information,
which has led to a situation of conﬂict [1,6]. Although, a
number of different university groups have actively
collaborated with the administration, which has gen-
erally had little public impact, because of both the
administration information policy and the discretion
with which these university groups have confronted this
subject, possibly as a consequence of the existing social
climate.
We will highlight here two examples of communica-
tion actions that have sprung up in the heart of the
universities—and other institutions—which constitute
responses to the attitude and to what has been
interpreted as errors made by the public administration.
Some professors from the University of Vigo set-up a
website [14] on November 21, 2002 ‘‘for the purpose of
collecting, in a rigorous and objective way, technical and
scientiﬁc information on the Prestige oil spill’’, in view
of the lack of ofﬁcial information. This website rapidly
became a reference point from which to follow the
evolution of the oil spill through the contributions of
different scientists and the synthesis of information and
monitoring data provided by French, Portuguese and
Spanish institutions. This website was later ‘‘institutio-
nalised’’ by the University of Vigo itself, curiously, when
the need for it and its relevance had declined. Moreover,
422 Spanish marine scientists from all types of institu-
tions published a letter in the journal Science [9] in
which they presented an analysis of the clear scientiﬁc
evidences advising against towing the vessel out to sea
and which would allow predicting easily the trajectory
of the oil spill. This letter has aroused a great amount of
controversy in the media as well as on a political level,
since it denounced a speciﬁc incident and was endorsed
by numerous professionals.
As far as the coastal zone is concerned (both
terrestrial and marine), the vast majority of scientiﬁc
knowledge is rooted in the universities. And from this
standpoint, they undoubtedly offer the basic intellectual
capital needed to analyse the impact and the recovery of
the coastal system, which was the most affected by the
disaster. The university has the necessary knowledge and
appropriate human resources, but it does not have the
tools needed to use this capital effectively in responding
to a crisis of this sort. In the Spanish university model, it
is not possible to obtain this response by making a
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demand on its members using a command-and-control
approach, and this is quite probably one of its greatest
virtues as a foundation on which to build scientiﬁc
creativity and innovation. Therefore alternative meth-
ods should be found based on positive incentives.
Basically, these incentives would entail the contribution
of human, material and organisational resources that
are new and different from the usual ones and they must
be speciﬁc to these cases. Secondly, there would have to
be professional incentives—economic or otherwise. We
must realise that for most scientists, an oil spill is not an
attractive subject for investigation, even from a psycho-
logical point of view, but especially because it requires a
rapid and intense learning (owing to its very nature, this
research cannot be programmed except in very speciﬁc
aspects), and the expectations of scientiﬁc productivity
are lower than for the typical research lines. The great
challenge yet to be tackled by the university focuses on
combining scientiﬁc freedom with organisational models
that are appropriate for situations of crisis. This
scientiﬁc freedom, which is hugely proﬁtable under
normal conditions and allows for the creation of human
capital with diverse interests and knowledge (essential in
situations of crisis), must be supplemented with mechan-
isms for the creation of interdisciplinary groups of
response and incentives to obtain the participation of its
scientists.
As a consequence of the above, in addition to being
slow, partial (in terms of objectives) and ineffective in
allocating resources, the scientiﬁc response did not make
use of the existing capital. Thus, a great deal of the
activities did not stem from an objective analysis of the
available information, which would allow for the
development of hypotheses that would serve to direct
the scientiﬁc actions. The slow response created an
initial gap in the information obtained on the impact,
which is essential for appropriate assessment. In the case
of the Exxon Valdez, for example, the NOAA set-up
groups whose purpose was to evaluate the status the
coastline prior to the arrival of the oil spill using
oceanographic information that made it possible to
predict the evolution of the oil spill [15]. A good example
is the monitoring of the assessment of the Prestige oil
spill in offshore waters, which is crucial to the
coordination of activities to combat pollution. The
Portuguese Hydrographic Institute provided detailed,
up-to-date information over the Internet from the very
start [16], which, day by day, proved to be an accurate
account of the situation. The Spanish Administration, in
contrast, did not manage to set up a similar monitoring
program until after the bulk of the oil spill had already
reached the coast [12]. Information on the chemical
composition of the fuel (and consequently its potential
toxicity) was published from the very ﬁrst days by the
French Centre de Documentation, de Recherche et
d’Expe´rimentations sur les Pollutions Accidentelles desEaux (CEDRE) [17], whereas it took the Spanish and
Galician Administration several weeks to provide this
information, and moreover, initially with different
results from those reported by the French institution
(and with a higher degree of ambiguity, especially in
relation to the presence of toxic compounds). Subse-
quent analyses conﬁrmed the veracity of the French
data, raising doubts about the initial information
provided by the Xunta de Galicia, which did not report
traces of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) of
high molecular weight in the fuel spilled by the Prestige.ED
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5. Publicly funded research actions
All of the above scientiﬁc initiatives materialised in a
limited number of actions funded by the public
administration, which started these activities after a
considerable delay, very likely jeopardising the procure-
ment of critical initial data on the environmental impact.
The Autonomous Government of Galicia has limited
itself to including the disaster caused by the Prestige on
the list of priority lines of its programs to ﬁnance
research projects, but it has not earmarked additional
funds to resolve these issues or, in any case, this aspect
has not been made public.
In December 2002, the Spanish Government set-up a
Scientiﬁc Advisory Committee which completed its
studies in February 2003. This committee focused on
providing solutions to the problem of the recovery of the
oil remaining in the sunk vessel and took little account
of the environmental impact question. In addition to
this initiative, the MCyT is the only public institution
that has summoned public participation with speciﬁc
ﬁnancing. The management of these actions has been
long-drawn-out and controversial (as discussed earlier)
but it has led to the creation of a Technical Ofﬁce of
Marine Spills (Oficina Te´cnica de Coordinacio´n del
Programa de Intervencio´n Cientı´fica para la Accio´n
Estrate´gica contra Vertidos Marinos Accidentales) [18],
with the participation of the Universities of Galicia and
Cantabrian regions, the IEO, CSIC and MCyT, in
charge of the management of two types of research and
assessment actions. Initially, between February and
April 2003, a series of Special Actions received funding
to cover especially urgent problems. These projects were
not open to public proposals and were negotiated with
research teams that could take on these tasks immedi-
ately. These Actions were planned for a period of 6
months (from May to November, 2003), and in general
consortiums of research groups have been set up to
resolve speciﬁc questions such as inter-calibration
among the laboratories in charge of the PAH analyses,
the initial impact on biological communities on coastal
and continental shelf ecosystems as well as the
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sank, to name but a few.
In addition, in March 2003, the MCyT called for a
three year strategic action on accidental marine spills to
ﬁnance projects lasting three years. This follows the
general system of open calls with priority lines and, in
some cases, constitutes the continuation of the urgent
actions discussed earlier.
To offer an approximate idea of the funding effort
made by the public administration, we must bear in
mind that both actions of the MCyT are funded in an
amount that probably does not exceed 10 million h,
according to several different unofﬁcial sources. In the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, the expenses earmarked for
damage assessment amounted to US$ 214 million, while
an investment of around US$ 180 million was made for
research and monitoring [19].75
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response and designing a contingency plan
The analysis conducted in the present paper has made
it possible to draw a number of conclusions regarding
the weak points of the Spanish public scientiﬁc system.
We will conclude by raising some basic ideas that might
help to improve the response of the scientiﬁc community
when faced with future environmental crises and to
optimise the use of available human and material
resources: E 8789
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TIt is necessary to develop a priori oceanographic andecological models and hypotheses that will allow
predicting the evolution of the spill and its environ-
mental and ecological consequences. These models
and hypotheses must be based on the available
knowledge on the potentially affected ecosystems
and on the physical and chemical characteristics of
the oil spill. For example, it is important to create
oceanographic models that can predict the transport
of hydrocarbons in terms of the geographical location
where the spill occurred and the climate and oceano-
graphic conditions of the zone, or foodweb models of
the ecosystems affected in order to predict the transfer
routes and the bioaccumulation of pollutants. These
models and hypotheses will allow designing research
and assessment activities in real time, directing the
available resources to the problems that are objec-
tively identiﬁed to be more pressing. Given the
current limited scientiﬁc knowledge, the development
of these models will require a combination of
predictive science and the local knowledge of the
scientists themselves and other social actors that have
interests and experience in these ecosystems, such as,
for example the ﬁshers or NGOs. Knowledge management systems are needed to workwith the available information on the natural
resources and ecosystems in the areas of interest. At
the present time, the available information on these
aspects is qualitatively and quantitatively important
and potentially very useful. However its lack of
systematisation makes it difﬁcult to access quickly. In
this sense, there are no initiatives for the creation and
maintenance of open-access databases on ecosystems
and marine resources, in fact there is not even any
open-access digital cartography available. These are
essential tools needed to aid managers and research
groups who must make rapid and well-informed
decisions in situations of crisis.F
The design of organisational and incentive systems to
allow the creation of temporary, large and well-
organised multidisciplinary teams. These groups
should be put together immediately after the crisis
starts and to have available the necessary resources to
carry out their work. It is essential for these groups to
collaborate actively with the local communities in all
the stages of the work.D 
PR
OOThe damage assessments requires initial evaluationsdone ‘‘in real time’’, including the collection of priorinformation in the areas affected, anticipating the
arrival of the oil spill by predicting its transport on
the basis of climate and oceanographic conditions. In
order to fulﬁl this objective, in addition to other
considerations, it is necessary to have protocols
included in the contingency plans that will be able
to offer an immediate response. In addition to the urgent scientiﬁc actions, it is crucial
to develop research programs in the medium and long
term, given that many of the effects can only be
detected on these time scales. To meet this objective,
there are two basic alternatives: the ‘‘normal’’ system
of funding calls (completely open and loosely directed
towards speciﬁc objectives) or the design of ‘‘closed’’
or ‘‘directed’’ plans which target the speciﬁc topics to
be studied and the most appropriate research teams to
carry them out. There is, of course, a wide range of
intermediate solutions that may be more or less valid
depending on the existing scientiﬁc knowledge and the
diversity of scientiﬁc ﬁelds of study. In any case, a
clear scientiﬁc policy that will allow to choose the
most appropriate option considering the existing
scientiﬁc context is needed. The design of public plans for the assessment and
management of crises of this type should consider the
participation of different social groups such as NGOs,
ﬁshers’ organisations, the aquaculture industry or
volunteer groups. This participation is needed to
design the programs for damage assessment and the
restoration of the affected ecosystems, for the
logistical collaboration in the development of the
tasks, to share knowledge and procure ﬁnancing. At
the same time, we must not forget that a crisis of this
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J. Freire et al. / Marine Policy ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]] 7type, and the Prestige oil spill is a clear case, entails
the contribution of donations by many social actors
who may play key roles in obtaining funding for these
types of actions.41
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